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The present study sought to understand the perceived well-being value of future goals as a possible explanation for why persons who are suicidal remain attached to goals that are seen as unattainable.  Deliberate self-harm patients (DSH; N = 24) were compared with matched hospital controls (N = 24) on a range of measures including current well-being and perceived future well-being in the context of imagined goal attainment.  Despite the DSH group having substantially lower current levels of well-being, there was no difference between the groups when forecasting their future well-being in the context of imagined attainment.  For DSH participants the thought of achieving an important future goal is seen as necessary and sufficient for attaining normal levels of future well-being, which may function to keep them attached to goals that are perceived as relatively unattainable.





Suicide is the tenth leading cause of death worldwide, accounting for 1.5% of all deaths (Windfuhr & Kapur, 2011).  Deliberate self-harm (DSH), though difficult to estimate precisely, is much more common than suicide, and suicidal thoughts are experienced by around one in six of the population (MacLeod, 2013).  DSH is clearly a broad category including serious attempts and self-harming behaviour with no intent to die.  Because of the difficulties in clearly categorising self-harming behaviour most research has operationalized DSH as any deliberate behaviour that has harming the self as its focus, irrespective of lethality or intent to die.  Whilst suicide reduction is an ultimate target, research has increasingly focused on deliberate self-harming behaviour, which in addition to representing a significant problem in its own right, is a major risk factor for suicide (Qin et al., 2009).  Much is known about the social and demographic factors associated with suicidal behaviour but less is known about the psychological factors (see O’Connor, Platt & Gordon, 2011).  Understanding more about the psychological processes closely associated with self-harming behaviour should enable targeted interventions and prevention strategies to be put in place for those individuals at-risk.  The present study addresses one aspect of the psychology of suicidal behaviour – future directed thinking, in particular the goals that individuals hold for the future.  
	Research investigating future-thinking has, to date, drawn a picture of deliberate self-harming individuals as being able to think of positive life goals but experiencing difficulties in thinking of how to achieve them (Vincent, Boddana & MacLeod, 2004) and believing they are unlikely to come about (e.g., Danchin, MacLeod & Tata, 2010).  A valuable aim for future research is to try to understand more about why it is those who self-harm remain attached to goals that they see as being relatively unattainable? Why do they not disengage with these goals and engage with new, different, goals?   Wrosch, Scheier, Carver and Schulz (2003) point out that there are benefits to disengaging from unattainable goals (goal disengagement) and re-directing attention and effort towards other attainable goals (goal-reengagement) and therefore understanding impediments to this adaptive process may be important in helping those who are suicidal develop a more helpful goal-directed orientation.
One possible reason why disengagement does not happen for some people is that they believe that attainment of a particular goal is essential for their happiness.  This stance towards goals has been called “conditional goal setting” (Street, 2001).  For example, a conditional goal setter may believe that they can only attain ‘the goal’ of happiness if they achieve the goal ‘to get a well-paid job’ or ‘to spend the rest of my life with Maria’.  Conditional goal setting has been found to be associated with depression in students (Street, 2001), cancer patients (Street, 2003), children (Street et al., 2004) and older adults (Street, O’Connor & Robinson, 2007).
	In relation to suicidal behaviour, Danchin et al. (2010) found that those who had recently self-harmed showed significantly higher levels of conditional goal-setting than controls, at the same time as judging their goals as significantly less likely to be realised.  These effects were true even when the DSH group were compared with non-suicidal psychological outpatients who had comparable levels of depression and anxiety.    MacLeod and Conway (2007) used the term “painful engagement” to describe this pattern of dependency on goals that are perceived as unlikely to ever come about.   In addition to measuring standard conditional goal setting, Danchin et al. (2010) tested whether goal attainment was seen as sufficient as well as necessary for participants’ happiness.   DSH participants were significantly more likely than the controls to rate that they would be “completely happy” if they attained their goals.   
	The measures of goals being seen as necessary and sufficient for future well-being that have been described are limited in two ways.  First, they rely on very broad, global judgements.  The first aim of the present study was try to measure goal dependency more directly by measuring current levels of well-being, asking people to construct a mental simulation of their important goals having been achieved and then asking them to rate their anticipated well-being in the context of the goal having been achieved.  This, of course, is still a measure of beliefs about future well-being in the context of goal achievement but is more direct than the broader question used by standard CGS measures and Danchin et al. (2010).  
A second limitation with previous research is the restricted operationalisation of well-being through asking people simply about their happiness, worth and fulfilment.  Whilst undeniably representing broad aspects of well-being, theories of well-being have developed more sophisticated, multi-component models of well-being.  Well-being is now viewed as having both subjective aspects (Subjective Well-Being - SWB), which are essentially about felt experiences, and more objective aspects that represent what are normally thought of as the good things in a life, for example, relationships, achievement, and so on (e.g., MacLeod & Luzon, 2014; Ryan & Deci, 2001).  These more objective models of well-being are themselves multi-component: for example, Ryff’s model of Psychological Well-being (PWB; Ryff, 1989) has six different aspects that define the well-being of a person.  One aim of the present study was to answer the question of whether certain particular aspects of well-being are seen as especially influenced by, or dependent upon, goal attainment.  In addition, no research to date has described basic levels of the theory-driven, multidimensional aspects of well-being within self-harming individuals; measuring both SWB and PWB allows construction of an overall well-being profile in a DSH group.





Forty eight participants were recruited.  Twenty-four of the participants were individuals presenting to an inner London Accident and Emergency (A&E) Department, following an episode of deliberate self-harm. The mean elapsed time between the act of deliberate self-harm and the research interview was 10.5 hours.  Twenty two of the group had taken an overdose (of whom ten had also consumed alcohol) and a further two had cut themselves, one of whom had also consumed alcohol.  Six individuals were presenting at A&E after their first DSH episode, nine reported between one and four previous episodes and nine estimated that they had more than four previous episodes. A matched group of controls (N = 24) was recruited from individuals attending A&E at the same inner London Hospital following accidental injury (mainly sports injuries) or minor illness. 

Measures
Demographics and suicidal behaviour.  Age, gender, and ethnicity were measured. Additionally, employment status and relationship status were measured as they were two factors that may have a particular salience for goals.  Controls were asked about whether they had any history of suicidal behaviour; those in the DSH group were asked about methods used in the current episode, timing of the current episode and the number of previous episodes.  Additionally, the A&E control group were asked about their reason for presenting to A&E.
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, Tellegen, 1988).  The PANAS is a 20 item self-report scale designed to assess positive affect (PA) and negative affect (NA).  The PANAS consists of 10 positive (e.g., interested, excited, strong) and 10 negative (e.g., distressed, upset, guilty) adjectives which participants are asked to rate how much they experience of, from 1 (‘very slightly or not at all’) to 5 (‘extremely’).  The two subscales are largely uncorrelated, have high internal reliability and test-retest reliability (Watson, et al., 1988).  Reliabilities for the present sample in the standard condition were α = .94 for PA; α = .86 for NA.
A number of different time-frames have been used with the PANAS.  In the current study the scale was administered under two instructional conditions.  Firstly, participants were instructed to indicate ‘the extent to which you have felt this way in the past week’.  Secondly, following the mental simulation of their most important life goal, participants were instructed to indicate ‘the extent to which you would expect to experience each emotion if you achieved your goal’.  Reliabilities in the present study for the anticipated future affect condition were α = .78 for PA and α = .81 for NA.
Temporal Satisfaction with Life Scale (TSWLS; Pavot, Diener & Suh, 1998). The TSWLS measures the cognitive component of subjective well-being.  The TSWLS consists of 3 subscales (past, present & future life satisfaction) each of which has five items with which participants are required to indicate their agreement, ranging from 1 (‘strongly disagree’) to 7 (‘strongly agree’).  The scale and subscales have good internal reliability (Pavot, Diener & Suh, 1998) and good convergent validity with other well-being measures (McIntosh, 2001). For the purpose of the current study, only the ‘present’ and ‘future’ subscales were used.  The ‘present’ subscale was presented in its original format.  Following the mental simulation of their most important goal participants also completed the ‘future’ subscale.  The tense of the ‘future’ items were modified to the present conditional tense to enable participants to rate their anticipated future well-being.  For example, ‘The conditions of my future life will be excellent’ was changed to ‘The conditions of my life would be excellent’.  Participants were instructed to, using the scale of 1 (‘strongly disagree’) to 7 (‘strongly agree’), indicate ‘how much you would agree with each statement if you achieved your goal’.  Reliabilities in the present study were good (α = .94 for Current and α = .82 for Future).
Psychological Well-Being Scale (PWB Scale; Ryff, 1989). Participants completed the 54-item version of the PWB scale which has six subscales: Self-Acceptance (positive evaluations of oneself and one’s past life); Personal Growth (a sense of continued growth and development as a person); Purpose in Life (the belief that one’s life is purposeful and meaningful); Positive Relations with Others (the possession of quality relations with others); Environmental Mastery (the capacity to manage effectively one’s life and surrounding world); and Autonomy (sense of self-determination.  On a scale from 1-6, respondents indicate whether they agree or disagree strongly, moderately or slightly with each statement.  Negative items are reverse coded so that higher scores on each scale reflect the presence of positive appraisals of psychological well-being.  This scale has been shown to have adequate internal consistency of subscales, with Cronbach alpha’s ranging from .72 to .82 (Hauser et al., 1992).  Initially, the scale was presented in its original format, with participants indicating their current agreement/disagreement with the statements.  Secondly, following mental simulation of their most important life goal, participants were instructed to ‘tell me the number that best describes the extent to which you would agree or disagree with each statement if you achieved your goal’.  Statements were re-worded to be in the present conditional tense.  For example ‘In general I feel confident and positive about myself’ was changed to ‘In general I would feel confident and positive about myself’.  Internal reliabilities (alphas) in the present study for the standard version and the anticipated future version, respectively, were: Self-Acceptance (.95; .62); Growth (.86; .79); Purpose (.89; .76); Positive Relations (.90; .91); Mastery (.93; .97); and Autonomy ( 83; .83)
Measure to Elicit Positive Future Goals and Plans (MEPGAP; Vincent, et al., 2004).  To elicit participants’ future life goals the goal generation section of the MEPGAP was used.  This is a semi-structured interview which asks participants to generate as many goals as they can for the future and gives them at least 60 seconds to do so.  When participants were unable to think of any further goals they were prompted with a list of different life domains: home life, work/education, money, social life, close relationships, health/fitness and emotions/feelings.  Following the generation of goals, participants were asked to indicate which goal was most important to them.  The nominated important goal was then used throughout the remainder of the research interview for ratings of Goal Likelihood and Conditional Goal Setting.
Goal likelihood. Participants were asked to indicate how likely they thought it was that their nominated goal would be achieved on a 5-point likert scale ranging from 1 (‘not at all likely’) to 5 (‘very likely’).
Conditional Goal Setting.   The conditional goal setting (CGS) scale (Street, 1999) uses three constructs relating to personal well-being (happiness, fulfilment and worth) to form three pairs of CGS and non-CGS statements.  Each pair of statements was placed at opposite ends of a 7-point Likert scale (e.g., 1 “Even if I do not achieve this goal I can still be happy”, to 7 “I can only be happy if I achieve this goal”).  Participants were asked to rate how dependent their a) happiness b) fulfilment and c) worth were on achieving their nominated important goal.  The internal reliability of the scale has been found to be high (Street, 2001) and in the present study was α = .92.
Procedure
After gaining informed consent, the researcher collected participants’ demographic details.  Following this, participants completed the well-being measures: PANAS, the ‘present’ subscale of the TSWLS and the PWB scale.  The MEPGAP was used to elicit participants goals for the future, and ratings (likelihood and conditional goal setting) were taken of the goal participants indicated to be most important to them.  Participants were then informed that “During the next part of the interview you will be presented with some of the same questionnaires again.  However this time I want you to complete the questionnaires whilst imagining that you have achieved your nominated goal”.  The participants were given the following instruction, “To begin with it would be helpful if you could spend a few moments really trying to imagine and bring to mind what your future would be like if you achieved your goal”.  The well-being measures (PANAS, ‘future’ subscale of the TSWLS, and PWB scale) were then re-presented using the ‘future’ orientated instructions previously described, asking participants to rate their anticipated well-being in the context of imagined goal attainment.  
All questions were asked verbally, with scales presented on A4 flashcards and the researcher recorded all participant responses.  The interview lasted between 30-60 minutes. Participants in both the deliberate self-harm and control group were assessed whilst in A&E.
Results
Table 1 shows the demographic details for the two groups. There were no group differences on gender (χ2 (1) = .87, p = .35) age (t(46) = .19, n.s.),  ethnicity (χ2 (1) = .44, p = .51), employment status(χ2 (1) = 1.42, p = .23) or relationship status (χ2 (1) = 1.37, p = .24).
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
As predicted, the groups did not differ significantly on the number of goals for the future that they could identify (DSH, M = 5.12, SD = 1.65; Controls: M = 5.46, SD = 1.41; t(46) = .75, p = .45), but the DSH group rated the likelihood of achieving their nominated future goal as significantly lower than did the controls (DSH, M = 2.46, SD = 1.18; Controls, M = 4.13, SD = 0.90; t(46) = 5.51, p < 0.001) and showed significantly higher levels of Conditional Goal Setting (DSH, M = 5.36, SD = 1.20; Controls, M = 2.51, SD = 1.12; t(46) = 8.48, p < .001).
Current well-being 
Table 2 shows the two groups’ scores on the well-being variables, both current reported levels and anticipated levels in the context of goal attainment. Considering Current levels of well-being first, the DSH group scored significantly lower on PA (t(46) = 5.26, p < .001), and Satisfaction with Life (t(46) = 7.55, p < .001) , and significantly higher on NA (t(46) = 6.90, p < .001). 
A Group (DSH, control) x Type (Positive Relations with Others, Self-Acceptance, Purpose in Life, Personal Growth, Environmental Mastery, Autonomy) mixed model ANOVA was carried out on the Current PWB scores only.  There were significant main effects of Type (F(1,46) = 24.17, p < 0.001) and  Group (F(1,46) = 39.61, p < 0.001), as well as significant  Group and Type interaction (F(1,46) = 11.18, p < 0.001) 
Follow-up t-tests compared the scores of the six subscales of the PWB scale between the DSH and Control groups.  Deliberate self-harm participants scored significantly lower than controls on the Positive Relations with Others (t(38) = 4.76, p < 0.001), Self-Acceptance (t(35) = 8.33, p < 0.001), Environmental Mastery (t(46) = 5.28, p < 0.001), Personal Growth (t(46) = 4.79, p < 0.001) and Purpose in Life (t(46) = 4.57, p < 0.001) subscales.  There was no significant between the groups on the Autonomy subscale the control group (t(46) = 1.19, p = .24).  
In order to profile the well-being of the deliberate self-harm group in a more illustrative way a comparison was made, using the controls as ‘population’ norms for each variable.  Each DSH participant’s score for a variable was calculated as the difference from the population (control group) mean and divided by the population standard deviation.  Therefore DSH participants’ scores on each well-being variable are represented as standard deviations from the control group mean.  This profile is shown in Figure 1.  NA scores have been reversed for illustrative purposes. The DSH group’s scores on all variables were between one and two standard deviations below the mean with the exception of Autonomy (< 1), Mastery (> 2) and Self-Acceptance (> 3). 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
Future well-being in the context of imagined goal attainment
The means and standard deviations of the ratings of current and future (in the context of imagined goal attainment) subjective well-being in the deliberate self-harm and control groups are shown in Table 2.  
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
Separate Group (DSH, Control) x Time (current, future) ANOVAs were carried out on PA, NA and LS.  The interactions were the focus of interest and in each case were significant: PA (F(1,46) = 37.67, p < 0.001); NA (F(1,46) = 21.29, p < 0.001) ; LS (F(1,46) = 72.24, p < 0.001).  Analyses have already shown that the groups differed on current scores.  Analyses on anticipated scores showed that the groups no longer differed on PA (t(46) = 1.17, p = .25), or on LS (t(46) = 1.07, p = .29) when judging how they would feel if their nominated goals were attained.  The DSH group still showed significantly higher NA (t(46) = 2.43, p = .02) although the highly significant interaction shows that the difference between the groups was much attenuated on the anticipated ratings compared to the current ratings.
	The means and standard deviations of the ratings of current and anticipated psychological well-being for the DSH and control groups are also shown in Table 3.  A Group (DSH, control) x Subscale (Positive Relations, Self -Acceptance, Purpose, Growth, Mastery, Autonomy) x Time (current ratings, anticipated ratings) mixed model ANOVA was carried out on the PWB scores.  Main effects of Subscale (F(5,230) = 12.08, p < 0.001), Group (F(1,46) = 20.24, p < 0.001), and Time (F(1,230) = 121.19, p < 0.001), and subscale x group (F(5,230) = 6.91, p < 0.001) and time x group (F(1,230) = 55.08, p < 0.001) interactions were qualified by a three way interaction (F(5,230) = 11.23, p < 0.001), 
To break down the three-way interaction six mixed model ANOVA’s, Time (current ratings and anticipated future ratings) x Group (deliberate self-harm and control), were carried out for each subscale separately. There were significant interactions between Time and Group for Positive Relations with Others (F(1,46) = 11.60, p = .001), Self-Acceptance (F(1,46) = 81.14, p < 0.001), Purpose in Life, (F(1,46) = 41.13, p < 0.001), Personal Growth (F(1,46) = 35.71, p < 0.001), Environmental Mastery (F(1,46) = 34.83, p < 0.001) and Autonomy (F(1,46) = 4.25, p = .045).  
	Post hoc t-tests compared anticipated PWB for each of the six subscales.  The lower PWB Current scores reported by the DSH group on five of the six subscales have already been described.  For Anticipated levels of PWB there was no significant difference between the two groups on Positive Relations with Others (t(46) = 1.88, p = .07), Purpose in life (t(46) = .21, p =  .10), Personal Growth (t(46) = .67, p = .50), Environmental Mastery (t(39) = .74, p = .46) and Autonomy (t(41) = .34, p = .73) in the context of imagined goal attainment.  However, the deliberate self-harm group scored significantly lower than the control group on anticipated Self-Acceptance in the context of imagined goal attainment (t(46) = 2.06, p = .045), although the difference is clearly highly attenuated from the one on Current levels. 
Discussion
As predicted, and in line with previous findings, those who had recently deliberately self-harmed were no less able than controls to think of future goals, showed higher levels of conditional goal-setting (belief in the necessity of their most important goal for experiencing happiness, self-worth and fulfilment) at the same time as rating the goal as less likely to come about.  The profile of current levels of well-being within the DSH group showed substantial deficits in all areas of well-being, with the exception of Autonomy; Mastery and especially Self-Acceptance were particularly low.  However, when rating anticipated well-being in the context of imaginal attainment of their nominated goal, those well-being deficits largely disappeared, with the exception of the DSH group still showing significantly, albeit attenuated, higher scores on NA and lower scores on Self-Acceptance.
Those in the DSH group showed the pattern of painful engagement described by MacLeod and Conway (2007) in having goals, those goals being seen as necessary for future well-being, but being less likely to think those goals would ever be attained.  The methodology devised for the present study extended these findings in two ways: by drawing on current multidimensional models of well-being and by directly comparing current and anticipated well-being in the context of imaginal goal attainment.  The first novel set of findings from the present study was describing the well-being profile of those who have recently self-harmed.  Well-being factors have often been neglected in formulations of deliberate self-harm which tend to emphasise the presence of negative psychological factors.  An exception is a study by Heisel and Flett (2004) who found in a psychiatric sample that purpose in life and satisfaction with life significantly explained levels of suicidal ideation over and above negative psychological factors.  The self-harm participants were lower on all aspects of well-being, with the exception of Autonomy, the deficit being particularly marked on Self-Acceptance.  Fava & Ruini (2003) highlighted that individuals who are low in Self-Acceptance are likely to maintain unrealistically high standards and expectations driven by perfectionistic attitudes and/or endorsement of external instead of personal standards.  Consistent with the findings here, O’Connor (2007) conducted a systematic review of the relationship between perfectionism and suicidality and concluded that perfectionism and self-criticism appear to be robust suicidal correlates in clinical and non-clinical populations.  Autonomy was the one well-being factor notably not different between the groups.  It is worth noting that although Ryff’s view of Autonomy is that it reflects challenged thriving (Ryff, 1989), it is possible that it may also be a marker for social isolation and a lack of integration with others.
The second novel aspect of the present study was the repeated measurement of well-being, comparing current with anticipated well-being levels in the context of imaginal goal attainment.  The broad lack of significant difference between the groups when forecasting their future well-being in the context of imagined goal attainment, adds further, more direct support to Danchin et al’s (2010) finding that deliberate self-harming individuals believe that goal attainment will be sufficient for their happiness.  On the face of it this positive future thinking appears beneficial, certainly when compared with a complete lack of belief in future goal attainment as a source of well-being.  However, fantasies about the future are distinct from beliefs about the future and Oettingen (2012) has suggested that positive future thinking in the form of fantasies is actually detrimental to effort and success.  Fantasy-oriented future-thinking, contrasts with adaptive thinking that involves mentally contrasting the desired positive future with the current situation and cognitively engaging with the steps needed to reach the goal.  Such adaptive thinking will involve thinking about obstacles and difficulties, something that will be challenging and not particularly enjoyable.  Similarly, Taylor (2011) distinguishes between outcome simulations (imagining the end point) and process simulations (imagining doing what is needed to get to the end point) and presents evidence that  whereas the former might be more enjoyable the latter is more likely to lead to the actual outcomes coming about.  Clearly, those in the present study who had recently self-harmed reported anticipating substantial benefit from future goal achievement, something that may be part of fantasy, outcome thinking about the future rather than more concrete, activity-focused thinking.  Whether such thinking plays some adaptive role, perhaps in preserving hope, alongside its possible maladaptive focus on unrealistic outcomes, remains a worthwhile question for future research to try to address.  The current findings appear to contrast with findings by Marroquin, Nolen-Hoeksema and Miranda (2013) indicating  that dysphoric students who reported a past suicide attempt, upon being presented with a list of future positive, hypothetical events, showed lower estimates than both dysphoric non-attempters and controls of how happy they would feel if those events occurred.  However, it is quite possible that hypothetical events elicit broad mood-congruent, schematic judgements, which are quite different to the sorts of judgements based on personal goals that were being elicited here.  Future research could try to contrast these two types of judgements about the future.
There is a further question about whether such optimistic projections of well-being following goal attainment are unrealistic.  How people might actually feel if their most important goal was attained, as opposed to how they think they would feel is not a question that can be addressed by the present study.  Indeed, it is a question that is difficult to answer at all given that it requires goals being achieved, something that could not necessarily be assumed in a longitudinal study, but it remains an interesting avenue for future research.  A small number of studies have attempted to look at predictive accuracy in dysphoria in relation to how people would feel following good or bad outcomes on a gambling task (Yuan and Kring, 2009) or having a date on Valentine’s Day (Hoerger, Quirk, Chapman & Duberstein, 2012), or simply on how they would feel over the next week (Wenze, Gunthert & German, 2012).  Again, these studies differ from the present study with its emphasis on personal, idiographic goal and the results have been very mixed in relation to whether dysphoria is related to underprediction or overprediction of positive future feelings.  
The exceptions to the general pattern of findings in the present study were that the DSH group still showed higher levels of NA and lower levels of Self-Acceptance following imaginal goal attainment.  The Self-Acceptance result appears simply to arise from the very low starting point of Self-Acceptance in the DSH group, so that even with a steep increase in scores there was still some shortfall on anticipated well-being scores.  It is also worth noting that Anticipated Self-Acceptance was the only variable to show relatively low levels of internal reliability.  In the case of NA, it appears that the control group appeared to derive more benefit on this well-being indicator from imagining goal achievement than they did on the other dimensions, thus preserving some of the gap between them and the DSH participants.  It is not clear why this was the case.  NA was the only negative aspect of well-being to be measured and it may be that for those who are already quite high in well-being that this was the variable that was most sensitive to change.
There were a number of limitations to the present study.  There was no non-suicidal psychiatric group, thus it is not possible to say whether differences were specific to suicidal behaviour.  Painful engagement is not a characteristic that is expected to be limited to those who are suicidal although it would be expected to be most marked in that population (e.g., Danchin et al., 2010).  The aim of the study was transparent and therefore raises the possibility of participants responding to demand characteristics, for example, giving higher well-being scores in the context of future goal attainment.  Set against this, the measures, some of which were quite lengthy, were administered twice and people would not easily have been able to remember their scores, thus a simple form of demand responsiveness was not possible.  Second, the control group did not respond with higher scores on the second measurement meaning that demand to give a positive response would have to have been present only in the suicidal participants, a group that would not necessarily have been expected to volunteer positive responses simply because they were expected.  Nevertheless, it might be possible to develop more sophisticated and subtle ways of asking people to rate future well-being in the context of imagined goal attainment than were used in the present study.
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Table 1. Demographic details for the sample

Demographic factor		Deliberate self-harm(N=24)	Control (N=24)
Age (years)	MeanSDRange	3613.4418-63	3511.2618-58
Gender	FemaleMale	186	159



















PA 	19.58 (9.17)	38.50 (5.04)	32.50 (7.79)	36.75 (5.35)
NA	33.29 (5.93)	15.00 (4.57)	21.04 (6.36)	12.17 (3.44)
SWLS	9.25 (4.80)	26.29 (5.13)	21.62 (6.44)	24.83 (4.30)
Relationships	32.96 (10.55)	42.21 (9.56)	44.96 (6.42)	46.54 (5.96)
Autonomy 	38.92   (7.51)	43.17 (6.87)	41.42 (7.08)	42.58 (4.77)
Mastery	25.04 (10.83)	45.17 (6.06)	38.71 (6.60)	44.08 (3.86)
Growth 	30.91  (8.32)	44.17 (6.13)	41.04 (6.16)	43.08 (5.01)
Purpose in Life 	27.92  (9.91)	45.50 (5.55)	39.54 (7.56)	42.71 (5.82)
Self-Acceptance 	19.96 (10.12)	39.63 (5.87)	39.50 (5.46)	42.54 (3.71)










Figure 1. Well-being profile of the deliberate self-harm group

Note: SWLS = Current satisfaction with life; PA = Positive Affect; NA = Negative Affect; POSREL = Positive Relations with others; ACCEPT = Self-Acceptance; PURPOSE = Purpose in Life; GROWTH = Personal Growth; MASTERY = Environmental Mastery.
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